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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 For over a decade, retailers who market wallpaper by 
providing sample books and showroom displays have feuded with 
dealers who sell at a discount through toll-free "1-800" 
telephone numbers.  In this case, ten 800-number dealers have 
accused the retailers' trade association and one of the leading 
wallpaper manufacturers of violating antitrust laws in an attempt 
to force them out of business.  The district court granted 
summary judgment to the defendants on these and certain state-law 
claims.  We will reverse the grant of summary judgment as to some 
federal and state antitrust claims but will affirm as to others 
and as to the 800-number dealers' tort claims. 
 I. 
 Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary; 
we evaluate the evidence using the same standard the district 
court was to have applied in reaching its decision.  Big Apple 
BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362 (3d 
Cir. 1992); J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 
1524, 1530 (3d Cir. 1990); Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City 
of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).  Plaintiffs have 
alleged three theories of antitrust liability under the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (the "Act").  A brief review of the Act and 
its purposes informs our determination of the standard to be 




 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: 
 Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal[.] 
15 U.S.C. § 1.  The very essence of a section 1 claim, of course, 
is the existence of an agreement.  Indeed, section 1 liability is 
predicated upon some form of concerted action.1  Fisher v. 
Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266 (1986); Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69 (1984); United 
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Big Apple BMW, 974 
F.2d at 1364.  See also Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 812 
(3d Cir. 1984) (section 1 claim requires proof of three elements, 
the first of which is "a contract, combination or conspiracy"); 
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 110 
(3d Cir. 1980) ("[u]nilateral action, no matter what its 
motivation, cannot violate [section] 1").  A "`unity of purpose 
or a common design and understanding or a meeting of minds in an 
unlawful arrangement[,]'" must exist to trigger section 1 
liability.  Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771, quoting American Tobacco 
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).  See also Fisher, 
475 U.S. at 267; Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 111. 
                     
1.   The term "concerted action" is often used as shorthand for 
any form of activity meeting the section 1 "contract, combination 
or conspiracy" requirement.  Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 
434, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 
 
 The requirement is an important one, for it emphasizes 
the distinction between section 1 liability, which is imposed for 
concerted action in restraint of trade, and liability imposed 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act for monopolization.  See 
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767.  Activity which is alleged to have 
been in violation of section 1 may be subject to a per se 
standard and engender liability without inquiry into the harm it 
has actually caused.  See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768.  See 
generally Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 
485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).  Alternatively, section 1 liability 
might be imposed for concerted action which violates the "rule of 
reason" standard without proof that it threatened monopolization.  
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768. 
 Congress treated concerted action more strictly than 
unilateral behavior because, 
 Concerted activity inherently is fraught with 
anticompetitive risk.  It deprives the 
marketplace of the independent centers of 
decisionmaking that competition assumes and 
demands.  In any conspiracy, two or more 
entities that previously pursued their own 
interests separately are combining to act as 
one for their common benefit.  This not only 
reduces the diverse directions in which 
economic power is aimed but suddenly 
increases the economic power moving in one 
particular direction.  Of course, such 
mergings of resources may well lead to 
efficiencies that benefit consumers, but 
their anticompetitive potential is sufficient 
to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of 
incipient monopoly. 
Id. at 768-69.  For this reason, when we examine an alleged 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, we look for an 
 
 
agreement that "brings together economic power that was 
previously pursuing divergent goals."  Id. at 769.  A lack of 
such divergent goals precludes officers of a single company from 
conspiring.  Neither internally coordinated conduct of a 
corporation and its unincorporated division, nor activity 
undertaken jointly by a parent corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, can form the bases of section 1 violations.  Id. at 
769-71. 
 An agreement need not be explicit to result in section 
1 liability, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 
U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911), quoted in Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 785 
(Stevens, J., dissenting), and may instead be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence.  Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount 
Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954); Sweeney, 
673 F.2d at 111; Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d 
Cir. 1951).  Therefore, direct evidence of concerted action is 
not required. 
 In this case, the parties contest the propriety of 
summary judgment on the issue of concerted action in each of 
three different alleged fact patterns.  Before addressing each 
fact pattern, we turn to a review of the summary judgment 
standard applicable to antitrust cases. 
 B. 
 A district court may enter summary judgment "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
 
 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The substantive law determines which 
facts are material.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986). 
 A party moving for summary judgment need not produce 
evidence to disprove its opponent's claim, Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), but it does bear the burden of 
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.  
Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1362.  As in this case, when the 
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the 
moving party may meet its burden by showing that the nonmoving 
party has failed to produce evidence sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to its case.  Celotex, 477 U.S. 
at 322. 
 In reviewing the evidence, facts and inferences must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment.  Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  When the moving party has 
pointed to material facts tending to show there is no genuine 
issue for trial, however, the nonmoving party "must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the 
material facts. . . .  Where the record taken as a whole could 
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 
party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'"  Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 586-87.  
 This traditional summary judgment standard applies with 
equal force in antitrust cases, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
 
 
Technical Services, Inc., 119 L.Ed.2d 265, 285 (1992); Big Apple 
BMW, 974 F.2d at 1362-63; however, the meaning we ascribe to 
circumstantial evidence will vary depending upon the challenged 
conduct. 
 For example, evidence of conduct which is "as 
consistent with permissible competition as with illegal 
conspiracy," without more, does not support an inference of 
conspiracy.  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597 n.21, citing Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984); Big 
Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363.  See generally Fineman v. Armstrong 
World Industries, Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1992).  
This is because mistaken inferences in such a context "are 
especially costly[;] they chill the very conduct the antitrust 
laws are designed to protect."  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594; 
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64.  In such cases, the Supreme Court 
has required plaintiffs to submit "evidence tending to exclude 
the possibility" of independent action, i.e., "direct or 
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that [the 
alleged conspirators] `had a conscious commitment to a common 
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.'"  Monsanto, 
465 U.S. at 764, quoting Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 111. 
 Conversely, if the alleged conduct is "facially 
anticompetitive and exactly the harm the antitrust laws aim to 
prevent," no special care need be taken in assigning inferences 
to circumstantial evidence.  Eastman Kodak, 119 L.Ed.2d at 291; 
Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Budd Baer, Inc., 826 F.2d 1335, 1339 
(3d Cir. 1987) (Monsanto and Matsushita do not apply when 
 
 
challenged action is overtly anticompetitive); Tunis Brothers 
Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 823 F.2d 49, 50 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(implying that Matsushita requires evidence tending to exclude 
the possibility of independent action only when the challenged 
conduct is as consistent with permissible competition as with 
illegal conspiracy).  See also In re Coordinated Pretrial 
Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d 
432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1990) ("the key to proper interpretation of 
Matsushita lies in the danger of permitting inferences from 
certain types of ambiguous evidence").2 
 II. 
 With these standards in mind, we will review the 
evidence, granting reasonable inferences to the plaintiffs.3 
 Persons interested in decorating or redecorating their 
homes or offices typically view samples of wallpaper before 
purchasing.  Recognizing this, retailers traditionally have made 
available to consumers the wallpaper sample books they purchase 
from manufacturers.  They have also provided consumers with 
information through the use of promotional materials and showroom 
                     
2.   Similarly, the analyses set forth in Monsanto and Matsushita 
do not apply when a plaintiff has offered direct evidence of 
concerted action.  Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Budd Baer, Inc., 
826 F.2d 1335, 1338 (3d Cir. 1987).  See also In re Coordinated 
Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 
906 F.2d 432, 441 (9th Cir. 1990). 
3.   Our review does not include consideration of evidence 
which was the subject of the three pending motions to supplement 
the record.  Nor will we consider citations to evidence in 




displays.  The purchase of sample books, establishment of a 
showroom and hiring of knowledgeable sales personnel are costly 
endeavors and, as one might expect, these costs are reflected in 
higher prices to consumers.  Manufacturers have encouraged 
retailers to incur these costs, however, because of a prevailing 
notion that their products sell better when marketed thus.  
 In recent years, a new breed of retailer has emerged.  
Some companies now accept orders from consumers all over the 
United States who call toll-free telephone numbers to order 
wallpaper after having availed themselves of the sample books, 
displays and assistance offered by conventional retailers.  
Today, purchasers may visit a conventional retailer's showroom, 
peruse the sample books, note the brands and product numbers of 
the patterns they like, and then go home and order wallpaper at a 
discount from an 800-number dealer.  This informed decision has, 
of course, been funded in part by retailers who will realize no 
return on their investment.  The 800-number dealer will arrange a 
"drop shipment" directly from the manufacturer to the purchasers' 
homes.4 
 Both conventional retailers and 800-number dealers are 
members of the National Decorating Products Association (the 
                     
4.   In the nomenclature of the marketplace, these 800-number 
dealers are "free-riders," who reduce or eliminate service to 
create price competition but who benefit from services such as 
wallpaper sample books, salesperson advice and showroom displays 
paid for and provided by other, full-service retailers.  See 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 
(1977); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 
F.2d 1358, 1376-77 (3d Cir. 1992).  
 
 
"NDPA"), a trade association comprised of independent retailers 
who sell a variety of decorating products.  The NDPA has about 
3,300 members who operate approximately 8,500 retail locations.  
Its policy is established and its business conducted by an 
18-member board of directors.  It sponsors a number of trade 
shows and educational programs for its members each year.  It 
also publishes a monthly industry news journal titled Decorating 
Retailer, and it formerly published a similar newsletter called 
Wallcovering Industry News. 
 A. 
 In the late 1970's and early 1980's, conventional 
retailers in the NDPA threatened to cease purchasing products 
from manufacturers who continued to do business with the 
800-number dealers, whom they referred to as "pirates."  The NDPA 
itself actively campaigned against 800-number dealers by lobbying 
manufacturers to recognize the advantages of conventional 
retailing and by encouraging them to "level the playing field" 
between 800-number dealers and conventional retailers. 
 For example, Robert Petit, NDPA's executive vice 
president and chief executive officer, spoke to manufacturers, 
including Michael Landau, president of F. Schumacher & Co. 
("FSC") on this subject.  Appendix ("App.") at 190-97, 202.  In 
February, 1983, Petit sent a letter on NDPA letterhead urging 
retailers to request from manufacturers sample books that did not 
reveal retail prices.  Depriving consumers of this information, 
Petit argued, would make it more difficult for them to avail 
themselves of an 800-number dealer's discount.  App. at 523.  The 
 
 
NDPA also marketed a "sales piracy kit" for conventional 
retailers to use in disguising or concealing pattern numbers and 
price information on sample books so that consumers could not so 
easily acquire the information and then order elsewhere.  App. at 
271-73, 407. 
 In 1985, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") issued a 
complaint against NDPA because of these activities.  In 1986, the 
parties entered into a consent decree which provided in part: 
 NDPA . . . shall cease and desist from: 
 
  A. Conduct having the purpose or 
effect of: 
 * * *  
 
   Expressly or impliedly advocating, 
suggesting, advising, or 
recommending that any of NDPA's 
. . . members refuse to deal with 
any seller of wallcoverings on 
account of, or that any of NDPA's 
. . . members engage in any other 
act to affect, or to attempt to 
affect, the prices, terms or 
conditions of sale, or distribution 
methods or choice of customers of 
any seller of wallcoverings. 
App. at 412.  The consent decree also provided: 
  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order 
shall not be construed to prevent NDPA . . . 
from publishing written materials or 
sponsoring seminars, or otherwise providing 
information or its members' views on topics 
including but not limited to cost accounting 
principles, and suggested prices and product 
identification numbers in wallcovering sample 
books to other sellers of wallcoverings, 
provided, however, that the information or 
views are not presented in a manner 
constituting a violation of any provision 





 In the aftermath of this settlement, as required by the 
consent decree, NDPA circulated a summary of the consent order in 
which it informed members that NDPA, as a group of competitors, 
was "already considered to be an `agreement.'"  App. at 430.  The 
NDPA guidelines for conducting meetings, drafted shortly before 
entry of the consent decree, also acknowledge that "a trade 
association is, by definition, a combination of competitors."  
App. at 740.  The guidelines further provide that before a 
chapter officer delivers a speech or makes a presentation at a 
meeting, he or she should state that the views expressed are his 
or her own and not those of the NDPA or any chapter.  App. at 
743. 
 Since the entry of the consent decree, NDPA has 
modified its lobbying efforts to some extent, but it has not 
ceased them.  The following passage from Petit's deposition 
testimony illustrates his view of the effect of the consent 
decree on NDPA's lobbying activities: 
  We changed some of the things we were 
doing.  One of the things that the [FTC] 
objected to us doing was, for example, having 
a sales piracy kit.  Their feeling on that 
was that -- which we didn't agree with at all 
[--] that we were projecting a single way for 
the dealers to take action, and that they 
felt that this was bad.  There was no problem 
                     
5.   We may, of course, consider evidence of activity 
necessitating the entry of the consent decree, as well as the 
terms of the consent decree itself, as part of the overall 
picture, or potential evidence of a pattern of conduct.  See Big 
Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1361; cf. Continental Ore Co. v. Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962). 
 
 
with the FTC of enumerating numerous things 
that might be done, but not to specialize in 
one particular thing.  So, therefore, we did 
drop the sales piracy kit. 
 
 * * * 
 
  We took extra care in everything we did 
to make sure we lived up to that FTC 
agreement. 
App. at 199.  Some NDPA members apparently believe NDPA has 
substantially altered its activities; one poll revealed that 
members have resigned because the NDPA is "not doing anything in 
regard to the sales piracy issue."  App. at 200.  Petit, however, 
has continued to impart to manufacturers, including Landau, his 
view of the advantages of conventional retailing over other 
methods of marketing wallcovering, such as 800-number sales.  
App. at 198. 
 B. 
 The sentiment against 800-number dealers continued to 
escalate even after the consent decree was entered.  Decorating 
Retailer published several letters from NDPA members, including 
some retailers who were former or current NDPA officers, urging 
action against the 800-number dealers.  Its editor, John Rogers, 
often solicited comment for the letters column by sending a 
variety of articles from a forthcoming issue to a number of 
people in the industry.  In each issue of Decorating Retailer, a 
standard statement appeared in the letters column apprising the 
reader that:  "The editor reserves the right to edit to fit space 
limitations or publishing policies.  Opinions expressed are those 
 
 
of the writer and not necessarily those of the editor."  E.g., 
app. at 496. 
 Decorating Retailer and Wallcovering Industry News also 
printed several news articles about 800-number dealers, most of 
which used the term "pirates" among other characterizations to 
describe them.  In May, 1988, one editorial -- a Perspective 
column in Decorating Retailer -- stated that "[t]here are 
increasing signs that the retailer's voice crying in the 
wallcovering wilderness is being heard," and cited many 
developments in the industry, such as "a sudden advent of bar 
coding kits for retailer protection of sample book pattern 
numbers," as signs that wallpaper suppliers were responding to 
retailers' needs.  App. at 758. 
 C. 
 Undoubtedly, FSC, a leading manufacturer which had 
always promoted the traditional method of marketing 
wallcoverings, heard the complaints.  In July, 1988, it announced 
a drop shipment surcharge on wallcovering deliveries directly to 
consumers, to take effect in September, 1988.  App. at 298-99.  
Under this new policy, FSC would impose a 7 percent surcharge on 
every order requesting drop shipment.  Obviously, this would have 
the effect of increasing the 800-number dealers' costs while 
decreasing their ability to compete on the basis of price with 
conventional retailers. 
 The minutes from FSC's management committee meeting in 
April, 1988, state that it considered the policy to be a signal 
to conventional retailers that FSC was trying to help them.  
 
 
App. at 290.  A draft press release, later revised, identified 
the protection of dealers from piracy as one reason for the 
surcharge.  Compare app. at 298-99 with app. at 1364-65.  Minutes 
from September, 1989, reveal that the management committee viewed 
the drop shipment surcharge as "a good first step" against 
800-number dealers.  App. at 304. 
 Beyond merely responding to dealer complaints, FSC also 
claimed that the surcharge was, in part, intended to recoup 
increased costs of drop shipments.  It did not, however, employ 
any particular formula or calculations to arrive at its surcharge 
figure or to determine its basis for recoupment.  Nor did it 
consult any source regarding or otherwise study such costs, 
although the record contains statements by another manufacturer 
indicating that his costs for drop shipments were no higher than 
for shipments to stores.  App. at 148-49, 622. 
 Predictably, retailers responded favorably to the 
imposition of the surcharge.  For example, in September, 1988, a 
Decorating Retailer editor's note responding to a letter about 
800-number dealers' advertisements stated that "there are signs 
that telling your troubles to suppliers eventually will be heard 
and some remedy may result."  App. at 485. 
 Yet the retailers were not entirely satisfied.  In 
January, 1989, at a convention in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Petit 
revisited the issue of 800-number dealers and the problems they 
posed for the industry.  An August, 1989 memo shows that Petit 
spoke to at least one manufacturer about "the anger felt by the 
retailers in lack of support from the wallcovering industry."  
 
 
App. at 185-86.  See also app. at 190-98, 201-07, 212-29, 404, 
416-19, 693-99, 700.  During this period, NDPA officer Clyde 
Morgan also expressed "concern about the 800-number and the 
effect it was having on me" at a meeting of industry leaders.  
App. at 183. 
 The fall 1989 planning session at FSC also reflected 
continuing concerns about 800-number dealers.  In September, 
1989, soon after an NDPA meeting, Landau stated at a management 
committee meeting that the surcharge was a good first step but 
that other measures were necessary.  App. at 304.  An October, 
1989 memo asked whether "we [should] make another anti-pirate 
move?  If so, what?"  App. at 793.  In November, 1989, Landau 
reported to the management committee what he had learned at an 
NDPA trade show:  "retailers squeezed by mass market & 800 #'s."  
App. at 307.  The minutes from that committee's meeting also 
include the following entry:  "800 #s:  Meeting with attorneys 
next week to formulate new strategy."  App. at 309. 
 D. 
 In January, 1990, FSC announced a local trading policy 
to be implemented in March, 1990.  App. at 694-97.  FSC dealers 
would be prohibited from selling FSC products outside of their 
"local trading area," thus effectively prohibiting 800-number 
dealers from selling FSC's products nationwide through their 
toll-free telephone numbers.  Immediately after this policy was 
announced, Petit circulated a copy of it to the NDPA board of 
directors, saying, "This is a major step forward in our battle 
against the 800-number operators."  App. at 693.  He also sent a 
 
 
letter to Landau on NDPA letterhead stating, "On behalf of the 
members of our decorating products associations, I want to 
express our appreciation of your actions."  App. at 700. 
 Five FSC executives testified that the purpose of the 
local trading area policy was to ensure that FSC dealers would 
realize a return on their investments in sample books and other 
FSC overhead.  App. at 1215, 1218-19, 1222-23, 1238-40, 1249-50, 
1340-43, 1520-22, 1550-52.  FSC's vice president of sales 
testified that if FSC had not taken action against the 800-number 
dealers, it "would continue to have resistance to purchasing 
sample books with the piracy issue."  App. at 691.  Indeed, there 
were several references in planning meetings to safeguarding 
against free riders and supporting conventional retailers. 
 Shortly thereafter, according to Decorating Retailer 
and Wallcovering Industry News articles, NDPA president John 
Wells spoke at a trade show in Anaheim, California.  The articles 
describe Wells as urging that "[i]nsisting on supplier support 
rather than coding books is the answer to piracy problems 
besetting wallcovering retailers."  App. at 440.  At the same 
show Petit, according to one of the articles, applauded 
manufacturers' efforts to fight 800-number dealers.  Id.  In 
accordance with NDPA guidelines, Wells specifically stated that 
his views were his own as an independent retailer, but the 
articles refer both to him and to Petit in their NDPA 
capacities.6 
                     
6.   FSC and NDPA argue that these articles constitute 
inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiffs respond that the articles are 
 
 
 In May, 1990, Rogers wrote a Perspective column in 
which he discussed the retailers' opposition to 800-number 
dealers, reviewed some of the methods retailers had adopted to 
guard against 800-number dealers' taking their business, and 
stated, "ultimately, the answer for the individual dealer is that 
given by Wells: `I will support those who support me.'"  App. at 
167.  Rogers testified that while the Perspective column does not 
represent the policy of the NDPA, to his knowledge there has not 
been an occasion when a comment published in it has contravened 
NDPA's policies. 
 Both before and after it instituted the policies in 
question, FSC received letters from retailers urging it to take 
action against the 800-number dealers.  Meanwhile, during this 
period the FTC repeatedly responded to inquiries from plaintiffs 
with the assurance that, in its view, NDPA was in compliance with 
the consent decree entered into in 1986. 
 E. 
 Anti-800 number dealer sentiment was not confined to 
retailers' ranks; manufacturers were also discussing 800-number 
dealers among themselves.  Between 1988 and 1990, wallpaper 
manufacturers discussed 800-number dealers at meetings of the 
(..continued) 
admissible as statements of NDPA, having been published in its 
own publications.  See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (statements are 
not hearsay if they are offered against a party and are 
statements of which the party has "manifested his adoption or 
belief in its truth").  We agree:  an employee of NDPA had to 
have written these articles, which were adopted by NDPA when it 
published them in Decorating Retailer and Wallcovering Industry 




Wallcovering Manufacturers Association ("WMA"), an organization 
in which Landau served as a member of the board of directors. 
 In April, 1988, for example, Landau reported to the FSC 
management committee that there had been "extensive discussion 
pirate situation" at the WMA meeting in Hilton Head.  App. at 
292.  Manufacturers also discussed bar-coding, in the context of 
either "pirate-proofing" sample books or standardizing labels and 
shipping containers.  FSC discussed with other manufacturers 
steps they were taking to combat 800-number dealers, such as 
engaging in cooperative advertising, imposing state sales taxes 
and imposing local trading policies. 
 800-number dealers were also discussed at conventions 
sponsored by a chain of wallcovering stores called Wallpaper-To-
Go.  App. at 313, 315.  FSC officials and other wallcovering 
manufacturers deny that they agreed with other manufacturers to 
take action against the 800-number dealers, however.  See FSC's 
brief at 42. 
 Other manufacturers reacted against the 800-number 
dealers in much the same fashion as FSC did.  In April, 1988, the 
owner of one company wrote an open letter to manufacturers about 
800-number dealers.  In it, he suggested that a task force be 
formed to establish an "effective, standard and universal method 
of `[p]irate-[p]roofing' sample books."  App. at 884.  At least 
one manufacturer took a step in that direction and coded its 
sample books so that style and price information could not easily 
be discerned.  App. at 139-41.  Another imposed a local trading 
policy, app. at 130-38, 151, and another tried, but discontinued, 
 
 
a cooperative advertising program with conventional retailers.  
App. at 127-28.  By August, 1989, two more manufacturers had 
imposed a drop shipment surcharge.  App. at 160, 789. 
 III. 
 In May, 1990, plaintiffs filed suit against NDPA and 
FSC.  Their amended complaint, filed in January, 1991, contained 
twelve counts, the first four of which provide the central focus 
for this appeal.  In Count I, they alleged that "[t]he individual 
retail wallcovering dealers, acting through the NDPA" violated 
section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into a horizontal 
conspiracy to eliminate the competition posed by 800-number 
dealers.  In Count II, the plaintiffs alleged that in response to 
the pressure exerted by the NDPA, FSC joined NDPA in a vertical 
conspiracy similarly designed to thwart competition.  In 
Counts III and IV, the plaintiffs alleged that FSC entered into a 
conspiracy with other, unnamed, wallcovering manufacturers aimed 
at eliminating 800-number dealers.  Specifically, plaintiffs 
challenged FSC's imposition of the drop shipment surcharge and 
its adoption of a local trading policy as being directed at 
them.7 
 Plaintiffs also alleged a claim under section 2(d) of 
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(d); state-law antitrust and 
                     
7.   Their amended complaint indicates that plaintiffs originally 
were concerned about two additional FSC policies:  FSC's failure 
to discuss cooperative advertising possibilities with 800-number 
dealers though it did so with conventional retailers, and FSC's 
charging state sales tax on drop shipments.  These policies, 
however, are not subjects of this appeal. 
 
 
restraint of trade violations; tortious interference with 
contracts and prospective contractual relations; fraud and 
misrepresentation; defamation and commercial disparagement and 
breach of contract.  In turn, FSC asserted various counterclaims 
against the 800-number dealers. 
 The district court granted defendants' motions for 
summary judgment on Counts I through IV and granted both 
plaintiffs and defendants summary judgment on various other 
claims and counterclaims.  Thereafter, the parties settled those 
claims which had not been disposed of, and plaintiffs filed this 
appeal challenging the district court's decision on Counts I 
through IV, the state-law antitrust claims, the tortious 
interference claim and the defamation claim against NDPA. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we exercise jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.8  In our analysis of each of the 
                     
8.   NDPA and FSC argue that we lack jurisdiction over this 
appeal because the district court failed to enter a judgment on a 
separate document in accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and had not yet awarded costs in accordance 
with Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
 
 In Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978) (per 
curiam), however, the Supreme Court recognized that the rules of 
civil procedure requiring entry of judgment on a separate 
document should be interpreted in a common-sense fashion.  "If, 
by error, a separate judgment is not filed before a party 
appeals, nothing but delay would flow from requiring the court of 
appeals to dismiss the appeal."  Mallis, 435 U.S. at 385-86.  See 
also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Western 
Pennsylvania Motor Carriers Assoc., 660 F.2d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 
1981).  The district court's failure to enter judgment in 
accordance with the dictates of Rule 58 appears to stem from 
oversight.  No other plausible suggestion has been advanced.  
Thus, we reject this jurisdictional argument. 
 
 
plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims, which allege three distinct 
antitrust theories of liability, we proceed from the premise that 
"plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof 
without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components 
and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each."  Continental 
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 
(1962). 
 IV. 
 At Count I, in which plaintiffs named only NDPA as a 
defendant, they alleged that conventional retailers, acting 
through the NDPA, conspired to pressure manufacturers to 
eliminate them from the marketplace.  The district court examined 
the record for evidence of "officially sanctioned NDPA activity," 
found none, and ruled that plaintiffs could not meet the 
"concerted action" requirement because "[t]he NDPA can only act 
pursuant to a resolution from its board and no such resolution 
has been identified."  App. at 37.  We will reverse. 
 A. 
 It is both uncontested and uncontestable that NDPA is 
an association of competing wallpaper dealers.  As such, when 
NDPA takes action it has engaged in concerted action so as to 
trigger potential section 1 liability.  Weiss, 745 F.2d at 816 
(..continued) 
 
 As to costs, we note that the parties' stipulation of 
settlement, which disposed of those counts as to which the 
district court had not granted summary judgment and which was 
entered as an order by the district court, provided that each 
party was to bear its own costs, thus implicitly if not actually 
resolving any Rule 54(d) issue. 
 
 
(hospital executive committee's actions are concerted action 
within the meaning on section 1).  "[A]ntitrust policy requires 
the courts to seek the economic substance of an arrangement, not 
merely its form."  Weiss, 745 F.2d at 815.  The actions of a 
group of competitors taken in one name present the same potential 
evils as do the actions of a group of competitors who have not 
created a formal organization within which to operate.  See id. 
at 816 ("[w]here such associations exist, their actions are 
subject to scrutiny under section 1 . . . in order to insure that 
their members do not abuse otherwise legitimate organizations to 
secure an unfair advantage over their competitors").  See also 
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
 We agree with NDPA's contention, however, that NDPA can 
only be held liable for concerted action if it acted as an 
entity.  See Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 857 
F.2d 96, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1988) (Weiss holds that when a group of 
competitors "acts as a body, it constitutes a `combination'").  
In Nanavati, we held that although the actions of a hospital 
executive committee might constitute concerted action, the 
committee does not engage in concerted action when it does not 
"act[] as an entity in furtherance of the conspiracy."  Id. at 
119.  As we explained there: 
 Our conclusion in Weiss was premised on the 
concept that where individual actors take 
actions as a group, they are a combination 
for the purposes of those actions.  Where no 
group action is taken, no such combination 
can exist.  In short, we did not hold in 
Weiss that because the actions of the medical 
 
 
staff constitute the actions of a 
combination, even where there is no 
allegation that the staff acted as a group, 
the `contract, combination or conspiracy' 
requirement has been met.  Such a group is a 
combination as a matter of law only for the 
actions it takes as a group. 
Id. 
 In Nanavati, the plaintiff did not maintain that the 
executive committee took any action as a group.  Id.  Instead, he 
pointed to the actions of medical staff members who were not on 
the executive committee as the basis for his claim.  He argued 
that the record contained evidence of a boycott against him by 
members of the medical staff, so the jury had not erred in 
finding that the executive committee had participated in the 
boycott.  Our search for evidence that members of the executive 
committee had acted in furtherance of the boycott yielded none; 
thus, we affirmed the district court's grant of judgment n.o.v. 
to the executive committee. 
 Nanavati teaches that concerted action does not exist 
every time a trade association member speaks or acts.  Instead, 
in assessing whether a trade association (or any other group of 
competitors) has taken concerted action, a court must examine all 
the facts and circumstances to determine whether the action taken 
was the result of some agreement, tacit or otherwise,9 among 
                     
9.   It would be incorrect to require an official board 
resolution, or other officially sanctioned activity, to impose 
liability on NDPA.  Recognizing that perpetrators of antitrust 
violations are often sophisticated businessmen, courts regularly 
permit agreements to be shown by circumstantial evidence.  See 
Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1364; Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954). 
 
 
members of the association.  See generally Nanavati, 857 F.2d at 
119-20. 
 Judicial scrutiny of alleged concerted action, 
undertaken to determine whether it was the result of an 
agreement, is an intricate endeavor.  In the straightforward 
case, such as when a stock exchange requires disconnection of a 
nonmember's private telephone wire, or a hospital executive 
committee votes to deny staff privileges to a member, the action 
is obviously a result of an agreement which is stamped with the 
imprimatur of the association by a vote or passage of a 
resolution.  See, e.g., Silver, 373 U.S. at 347; Weiss, 745 F.2d 
at 816.  We can hardly say, however, that this case falls within 
that genre. 
 Here, plaintiffs rely on American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982), to 
argue that NDPA took concerted action when its officers spoke out 
in protest against the 800-number dealers' business methods and 
when NDPA publications included letters complaining about 
800-number dealers.  In Hydrolevel, the Supreme Court, relying on 
general principles of agency law, determined that the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers ("ASME") could be held liable for 
the actions of its officers and agents taken with apparent 
authority.  Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun held that 
imposing liability based upon apparent authority comported with 
the intent of the antitrust laws because ASME possessed great 
power and the codes and standards it issued influenced policies 
and affected entities' abilities to do business.  Hydrolevel, 456 
 
 
U.S. at 570.  "When it cloaks its subcommittee officials with the 
authority of its reputation, ASME permits those agents to affect 
the destinies of businesses and thus gives them the power to 
frustrate competition in the marketplace."  Id. at 570-71.  
Imposing antitrust liability on the association for the actions 
of its agents would encourage ASME to police its ranks and 
prevent the use of associations by one or more competitors to 
injure another.  See generally id. at 571-73.  See also M. 
Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 Geo. L. 
J. 395, 417-18 (1986).10 
 In deciding Hydrolevel, the Court rejected ASME's 
argument that it should not be held liable unless its agents had 
acted with an intent to benefit it.  This argument was 
irrelevant, the Court held, in part because "[w]hether they 
intend to benefit ASME or not, ASME's agents exercise economic 
power because they act with the force of the Society's reputation 
behind them."  Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 574.  The Court viewed the 
imposition of liability regardless of the agents' intent as more 
                     
10.   Judge Boudin notes that the Supreme Court in Hydrolevel 
viewed ASME as an "extra-governmental agency" regulating its own 
industry.  American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. 
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 570 (1982).  See M. Boudin, 
Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 Geo. L. J. 395, 
417 (1986).  Indeed, Hydrolevel and many other trade association 
cases have focused on this role and on associations' 
standard-setting or industry-regulating activities.  See e.g. 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & 
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Moore v. Boating Industry 
Assoc., 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1987).  See generally ABA 
Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments 86-91 (3d ed. 
1992).  Notably, the case before us does not involve 
standard-setting or industry-regulating activity on NDPA's part. 
 
 
consistent with the purposes of antitrust law, since this would 
encourage ASME to police its agents so as to prevent the 
anticompetitive effects of their using its name and power even in 
individual efforts at restraining trade.  Id. 
 The issue presented here, however, is markedly 
different.  In Hydrolevel, the plaintiff had named three 
defendants in its conspiracy claim.  Although it is difficult to 
discern the exact contours of the alleged conspiracy from the 
Hydrolevel opinion, it is quite clear that the plaintiff there 
was not seeking to hold ASME liable for concerted action solely 
on the basis of actions taken by one official with apparent 
authority.  The conspiracy alleged apparently was between the 
chairman of an ASME standards committee and the plaintiff's 
primary competitor; the question before the Court was whether 
ASME could be held liable for its agent's anticompetitive 
activity in participating in the conspiracy even though no one 
else at ASME had authorized the violation.  Because a conspiracy 
was alleged to have taken place between the ASME official and 
another conspirator, the Court did not address the question of 
whether an agent with apparent authority can cause a trade 
association to be held liable for violating the antitrust laws by 
taking action on behalf of the association which would have 
amounted to such a violation if the association itself, as a 
combination of competitors, had undertaken it. 
 We believe that the Hydrolevel rule that an 
association's economic power may justify its being held liable 
for the actions of its agents cannot be extended to defeat the 
 
 
"concerted action" requirement of section 1.  Imposing liability 
on an association, as we did in Weiss, does not abolish or 
diminish the first element of section 1 liability; it merely 
recognizes that a group of competitors with a unity of purpose 
are engaged in concerted action, whether or not they act under 
one name.  As we explained in Nanavati, in the absence of a 
co-conspirator, an association's actions satisfy the concerted 
action requirement only when taken in a group capacity.  The 
potential for antitrust liability arising from the concerted 
action of a group such as a trade association, as that liability 
may be established by the apparent authority of an agent to speak 
on behalf of and bind that association, has not yet been fully 
explored in a trade restraint case.11  In Hydrolevel, for 
example, the Court described the concept of apparent authority as 
one which results in liability on a principal's part for an 
agent's torts.  Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 565-66.  Thus, if an 
agent commits fraud, his or her principal is liable if he or she 
                     
11.   There is, however, authority for the proposition that a 
trade association, in and of itself, is a unit of joint action 
sufficient to constitute a section 1 combination.  See G.D. 
Webster, The Law of Associations § 9a.01[1], 9A3-4 (1991) ("There 
is no question that an association is a `combination' within the 
meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Although a conspiracy 
requires more than one person, an association, by its very nature 
a group, satisfies the requirement of joint action.  Thus, any 
association activity which restrains interstate commerce can be 
violative of Section 1 even if no one acts in concert with the 
association."); Stephanie W. Kanwit, FTC Enforcement Efforts 
Involving Trade and Professional Associations, 46 Antitrust L.J. 
640, 640 (1977) ("Because trade associations are, by definition, 
organizations of competitors, they automatically satisfy the 
combination requirements of § 1 of the Sherman Act.") 
 
 
acted with apparent authority to act on behalf of that principal.  
Id. at 566.  Similarly, if an agent acting with apparent 
authority makes misrepresentations that cause pecuniary loss to a 
third party or is "guilty of defamation," the principal is 
liable.  Id.  See also id. at 568; see generally Restatement 
(Second) of Agency §§ 215 et seq. (a principal is liable for the 
"torts of its servants" and for its "servants' tortious 
conduct").  Applying that general principle to the antitrust area 
leads us to conclude that a principal will be liable for an 
antitrust violation if an agent acting with apparent authority 
violates the antitrust laws, as one did in Hydrolevel by 
conspiring with another person.  See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 572 
(speaking in terms of finding "ASME . . . civilly liable for the 
antitrust violations of its agents acting with apparent 
authority" (emphasis added)). 
 We are dealing here, however, with a trade association 
which is charged with violating the antitrust laws by 
constituting a horizontal conspiracy to eliminate the 800-number 
dealers.  Clearly, an association, as a combination of its 
members, can violate the antitrust laws through such a 
conspiracy.  This was the nature of the claim which prompted the 
FTC to initiate its complaint against the NDPA in 1985.  The 
singular characteristic of plaintiffs' allegations here is that 
the association is now charged with acting through agents whom it 
has imbued with apparent authority.  It is uncontested that the 
NDPA is highly sophisticated and possesses significant market 
power; it is unrealistic to think that such a sophisticated trade 
 
 
association, wary of the antitrust laws, would ingenuously act as 
an association in endorsing the type of activity forbidden by the 
consent decree. 
 In considering the antitrust implications of this 
situation, though, our first concern must be whether plaintiffs' 
allegations demonstrate an antitrust violation.  Specifically, we 
must determine whether statements by NDPA officers demonstrate 
that NDPA recommended that its members refuse to deal with any 
seller of wallcoverings on account of the prices or distribution 
methods of that seller.  We must also determine whether the 
evidence could show that the NDPA officers' statements were made 
with the apparent authority of the membership of the NDPA for 
those officers to act as the NDPA's agents.  This method of 
analysis is consistent with Hydrolevel, which instructs that a 
court must find an antitrust violation before deciding whether to 
hold an association liable for that violation by virtue of the 
perpetrator's apparent authority.12 
 B. 
 Having focused our inquiry not just upon whether Petit 
or other NDPA agents might have acted with apparent authority but 
also upon whether their actions could constitute an antitrust 
                     
12.   We do not, however, require that members of NDPA 
actually ratify an agent's actions before NDPA may be held liable 
for them.  Such a rule not only would be unrealistic, see supra 
note 9, but it also would contravene the Court's admonition that 
agents of trade associations acting with apparent authority 
exercise the associations' economic power regardless of whether 
they are acting to benefit the associations.  Hydrolevel, 456 
U.S. at 573-74. 
 
 
violation in the absence of that authority, we believe that a 
rational jury could find for the plaintiffs if the evidence 
presented to us is proven at trial.  As noted previously, Petit 
has acknowledged that since the entry of the FTC consent decree 
he has continued to urge manufacturers to take steps to hinder 
800-number dealers in the conduct of their business.  App. at 
199, 407.  He described himself as conveying "the concerns of 
NDPA," app. at 191, and he stated that he views it as part of his 
job to convey those concerns.  App. at 192. Additionally, once 
FSC announced its local trading policy, Petit circulated a copy 
of it to the NDPA board of directors along with a memorandum 
which could be read as triumphant.  App. at 693.  From this, a 
rational juror could infer that Petit viewed himself as being 
authorized by the NDPA to make the statements he made. 
 Moreover, the record contains evidence from which a 
rational juror could also infer that Petit's actions represented 
concerted action.  That is, a jury could find that, while 
representing NDPA, Petit went beyond merely voicing complaints to 
manufacturers to actually coercing (or attempting to coerce) them 
into cooperating in eliminating 800-number dealers.  There is 
some evidence that Petit emphasized to manufacturers with whom he 
met "the anger felt by the retailers in [the] lack of support 
from the wallcovering industry."  App. at 185.  See also app. at 
190-98, 218-29.  Such evidence, when viewed against the existing 
backdrop of urgings from NDPA officers and editors that retailers 
should support only those manufacturers who supported them, could 
imply a threat of a retailers' boycott if manufacturers did not 
 
 
take steps to help eliminate 800-number dealers from the 
marketplace. 
 In sum, nothing in either the antitrust laws or the FTC 
consent decree prohibits NDPA from voicing complaints.  Granting 
all reasonable inferences to the plaintiffs, however, a rational 
jury could find that NDPA did more than serve as a conduit for 
members' complaints in this case.  It could, for example, find 
that NDPA, acting through its officers, threatened a retailers' 
boycott of manufacturers and thus could hold NDPA liable for a 
section 1 violation.  For these reasons, we will reverse the 
district court's grant of summary judgment at Count I. 
 V. 
 At Count II, plaintiffs alleged that FSC responded to 
pressure from the NDPA by conspiring with it to eliminate 
800-number wallpaper dealers from the marketplace.  Their 
allegations flow directly from evidence of FSC's taking actions 
to eliminate free riders from the marketplace in response to 
conventional retailers' complaints (and, possibly, threats of 
boycott).  There is no dispute that plaintiffs are free riders, 
and there is no question as to the legitimacy of a manufacturer's 
desire to rid the marketplace of free riders.  See Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); cf. Big 
Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1377-78.  Therefore, the scenario which is 
the focus of Count II is as consistent with procompetitive 




 In Monsanto, a case which also involved an alleged 
conspiracy to terminate a dealership relationship because of 
other dealers' complaints, the Supreme Court noted: 
 Permitting an agreement to be inferred merely 
from the existence of complaints, or even 
from the fact that termination came about `in 
response to' complaints, could deter or 
penalize perfectly legitimate conduct.  
[C]omplaints about price cutters `are natural 
-- and from the manufacturer's perspective, 
unavoidable -- reactions by distributors to 
the activities of their rivals.'  Such 
complaints . . . `arise in the normal course 
of business and do not indicate illegal 
concerted action.' . . .  Moreover, 
distributors are an important source of 
information for manufacturers.  In order to 
assure an efficient distribution system, 
manufacturers and distributors constantly 
must coordinate their activities to assure 
that their product will reach the consumer 
persuasively and efficiently.  To bar a 
manufacturer from acting solely because the 
information upon which it acts originated as 
a price complaint would create an irrational 
dislocation in the market. 
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64.  Thus, we exercise a measure of 
caution when drawing inferences from such facts; "a fine line 
demarcates concerted action that violates antitrust law from 
legitimate business practices."  Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363, 
citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-64.  See also Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 597 n.21.13 
                     
13.   In Matsushita, the Supreme Court, in the context of an 
alleged horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, ruled that the case 
should not proceed to trial because the petitioners lacked a 
rational motive to conspire in the manner alleged.  It also 
noted, however, that its ruling was not meant to "imply that, if 
petitioners had had a plausible reason to conspire, ambiguous 
conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy.  
Our decision in Monsanto . . . establishes that conduct that is 
 
 
 In Big Apple BMW, plaintiffs alleged that BMW of North 
America, Inc. ("BMW") had refused to grant automobile dealerships 
to them because other dealers had complained about plaintiffs' 
high-volume, deep-discount business methods.  BMW asserted a 
variety of legitimate business reasons for its actions, including 
a concern about plaintiffs being "free-rider" dealers.  
Plaintiffs, however, presented evidence that they would not have 
posed the "free-rider" problem BMW feared, see Big Apple BMW, 974 
F.2d at 1377, and that a person with the same advertising tactics 
as theirs (high-volume, deep-discount "sellathons") had been 
granted a BMW franchise.  Id. at 1378.  They also presented 
evidence tending to discredit the other reasons BMW proffered to 
support its refusal to grant them a franchise.  Id. at 1377-80. 
 We reversed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment because plaintiffs had advanced evidence tending to 
exclude the possibility of BMW's having acted independently from 
the complaining dealers.  They had "countered each alleged reason 
with evidence that both discredits BMW NA's witnesses and 
provides independent support for the [plaintiffs'] claim that BMW 
NA and its dealers acted in concert to repel" plaintiffs' 
competition.  Id. at 1380. 
 Similarly, in Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General 
Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1986), we reversed a grant of 
summary judgment because defendant General Motors Corporation 
(..continued) 
as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal 
conspiracy does not, without more, support even an inference of 
conspiracy."  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597 n.21. 
 
 
("GMC") first favorably viewed plaintiff's franchise application, 
then heard its dealers' disapproval and threatened 
non-cooperation, and then denied the application.  GMC had not 
expressed concern about the plaintiff's franchise application 
until it heard its dealers' complaints.  We held that "we must 
infer that [the dealers'] conduct contributed to GMC's decision 
not to award [the plaintiff] the Buick franchise."  Arnold 
Pontiac, 786 F.2d at 573. 
 In marked contrast to Big Apple BMW and Arnold Pontiac, 
here the 800-number dealers concede that they are free riders.  
It is also undisputed that FSC has for years sold sample books 
and promotional materials and has encouraged its dealers to 
invest in these and other overhead costs in order to provide 
better service to their customers.  A jury could find that, 
because FSC had for years recognized the importance of selling 
service, its actions aimed at 800-number dealers were entirely 
consistent with its previously held view of its own self-interest 
and do not tend to demonstrate that it acted in conjunction with 
anyone in implementing its policies. 
 On the other hand, however, the record also contains 
evidence that may indicate concerted action between FSC and NDPA.  
Specifically, plaintiffs highlight two examples of what they 
claim to be FSC's assertion of pretextual reasons for its 
actions.  If FSC in fact advanced reasons for its actions which 
were pretextual, this would tend to support an inference that it 
acted as part of a conspiracy with conventional retailers.  See 
Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1374-80. 
 
 
 First, plaintiffs point to evidence in FSC's management 
committee minutes which contrast the "objective" of its drop 
shipment surcharge ("To make statement to industry that we are 
trying to help them") with the "rationale" for this surcharge 
("To protect legitimate customers, [t]o increase margins in this 
area").  App. at 290.  They also point to a parallel distinction 
between FSC's original and published press releases announcing 
the surcharge.  The original press release stated: 
 In direct response to retailer requests, we 
at F. Schumacher & Company are proud to 
announce that we will assertively support our 
dealers in their local trading areas and 
protect them from sales piracy by adding a 
seven percent surcharge onto all drop 
shipments . . .  While bar coding is a 
breakthrough for the industry in terms of 
product identification we feel that it alone 
is not an entirely effective deterrent 
against sales piracy . . . .  Our approach 
attacks the problem at its root and makes the 
accounts who drop ship feel the effects, 
rather than leaving the responsibility of 
policing to the retailers. 
 
App. at 298-99.  The final press release stated that the policy 
was not designed to combat "piracy" but rather to 
 help insure that our consumers receive the 
best possible service and that our 
wallcovering brands are supported in the most 
effective and appropriate manner at retail 
. . .  This policy seeks to encourage all 
dealers to concentrate their selling efforts 
exclusively within their own trading areas 
where they can provide service directly to 
the consumers to whom they sell the product. 
 
App. at 486. 
 Plaintiffs argue that these inconsistencies in and 
contrasts between the internal and the public explanations of the 
 
 
drop shipment policy reveal that FSC was attempting to disguise 
the true reason for its actions.  We agree; while the two 
statements and the two press releases could be seen as being in 
harmony with FSC's explanation that it took the action it did to 
protect the investments made by traditional retailers, a jury 
might view FSC's apparent desire to use more genteel language 
when explaining its actions to the public as implying a sinister 
motive. 
 Second, plaintiffs argue that although FSC acknowledges 
that dealer complaints were part of the reason for its surcharge, 
at one time it also stated that the surcharge was intended in 
part to recoup increased costs associated with drop shipments.  
FSC did not, however, use mathematical calculations to arrive at 
its surcharge figure; it neither consulted anyone regarding nor 
studied such costs, and the record contains statements by another 
manufacturer indicating that his costs for drop shipments were no 
higher than for shipments to stores.  This, plaintiffs argue, 
underscores the arbitrariness of the surcharge and evinces FSC's 
true, sinister motive. 
 A lack of market research, while perhaps adding luster 
to plaintiffs' contention that the surcharge was arbitrarily 
determined, does not necessarily invite an inference that FSC's 
statement was an attempt to conceal a conspiracy.  It is true 
that the seven percent figure did not reflect an analysis of 
FSC's costs; however, this does not indicate that FSC was not 
pursuing its self interests in imposing it.  Nevertheless, 
viewing this evidence in conjunction with the press releases and 
 
 
the retailer pressure on FSC, it is not an implausible conclusion 
that FSC may have imposed the surcharge without first undertaking 
mathematical calculations because it had agreed with others to 
impose the surcharge whether it made economic sense or not. 
 Accordingly, because there is some evidence from which 
a rational jury could infer that FSC advanced pretextual reasons 
for its policies, and might in turn infer that FSC had acted in 
concert with NDPA in deciding to implement policies designed to 
injure 800-number dealers, we will reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment at Count II. 
 VI.  
 At Counts III and IV, plaintiffs allege that FSC 
conspired with other wallcovering manufacturers to injure the 
800-number dealers.  We will affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment as to these counts because plaintiffs' evidence 
tends to show only an opportunity to conspire, not an agreement 
to do so. 
 Certainly, direct evidence (or a direct inference) of 
an agreement between FSC and other manufacturers regarding 
800-number dealers could enable plaintiffs to show concerted 
action.  The evidence of an agreement, however, amounts to 
nothing more than communications on the 800-number subject.  
Communications alone, although more suspicious among competitors 
than between a manufacturer and its distributors, do not 
necessarily result in liability.  Tose v. First Pennsylvania 
Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 894 (3d Cir. 1981).  As we have 
observed, it is only when those communications rise to the level 
 
 
of an agreement, tacit or otherwise, that they become an 
antitrust violation. 
 Thus, plaintiffs are left to argue that FSC and other 
manufacturers conspired based upon their parallel conduct.  
"[P]roof of consciously parallel business behavior is 
circumstantial evidence from which an agreement, tacit or 
express, can be inferred but . . . such evidence, without more, 
is insufficient unless the circumstances under which it occurred 
make the inference of rational, independent choice less 
attractive than that of concerted action."  Bogosian v. United 
States, 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977).  The circumstances 
necessary to support such an inference are:  (a) a showing that 
the defendants acted contrary to their own economic interests; 
and (b) satisfactory demonstration of a motivation to enter an 
agreement.  Id., citing Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral 
Products Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1975).  See also 
Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling Delaware Co., Inc., 
998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993); Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 In particular, when evidence shows communications which 
provided an opportunity for agreement, a plaintiff must still 
produce evidence permitting an inference that an agreement in 
fact existed.  Venzie, 521 F.2d at 1313.  The evidence must give 
rise to more than speculation.  Id. 
 In Venzie, for example, plaintiffs contended that two 
defendant corporations had agreed to refuse to sell fireproofing 
material to them.  The record contained evidence that defendants 
 
 
had made numerous telephone calls, at least one of which 
concerned the plaintiffs, to each other and had met for lunch.  
We held that it was for the jury to assess the credibility of the 
defendants' assertions that they had not discussed or agreed upon 
the alleged refusal to deal, but, even disregarding statements to 
that effect, all that plaintiffs' evidence proved was an 
opportunity for an agreement, which would not suffice to support 
a verdict.  Plaintiffs had failed to highlight evidence 
supporting an inference that an agreement in fact existed and 
thus could not support a verdict.  Venzie, 521 F.2d at 1312.  See 
also Tose, 648 F.2d at 895. 
 In contrast, a particularly detailed memorandum of a 
telephone call can give rise to a reasonable inference of 
agreement.  In Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 254 (2d Cir 
1987), for example, the plaintiff survived a summary judgment 
motion by advancing evidence in the form of detailed memoranda 
indicating the existence of an agreement. 
 In this case, it is conceded that manufacturers 
discussed 800-number dealers, and actions they were taking 
concerning them, at conventions.  The evidence of communications 
thus falls somewhere between Venzie, in which there were no 
notations of the subject matter of the conversations, and Apex 
Oil, in which the notations implied an agreement.  Plaintiffs, 
however, seek to infer an agreement from those communications 
despite a lack of independent evidence tending to show an 
agreement and in the face of uncontradicted testimony that only 
informational exchanges took place.  Without more, they cannot do 
 
 
so.  Cf. Tose, 648 F.2d at 894 (mere disbelief of contrary 
testimony does not prove agreement). 
 We emphasize that unlike actions such as price-cutting, 
which provide the classic example of conscious parallelism, FSC's 
action was in its economic interests.  It is simple syllogistic 
reasoning that if FSC was aware that most of its dealers were 
conventional retailers, and believed that its products sold 
better in the conventional setting, it would conclude that it was 
in its economic interests to keep the conventional retailers 
satisfied.  That FSC may have foregone some short-term 
opportunity for sales to 800-number dealers does not suffice to 
show it acted contrary to its self-interests when its actions 
clearly would benefit it economically in the long term.  Tose, 
648 F.2d at 895; see P. Areeda, Antitrust Law § 1415e (1986).  
FSC's listening to retailers' complaints in no way implies that 
there was an agreement among manufacturers to do the same.  See 
Venzie, 521 F.2d at 1314 ("[t]he absence of action contrary to 
one's economic interest renders consciously parallel business 
behavior `meaningless, and in no way indicates agreement,'" 
quoting Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman 
Act:  Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. 
Rev. 655, 681 (1962)); see also Houser v. Fox Theatres Management 
Corp, 845 F.2d 1225, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1988) (requiring both 
actions contrary to economic interests and motive to conspire). 
 VII. 
 Remaining for disposition are the plaintiffs' state-law 
antitrust and tort claims.  To the extent that their state-law 
 
 
antitrust claims mirror their federal antitrust claims, we will 
dispose of those claims in like manner.  We will affirm the 
district court's disposition of the state-law tort claims. 
 A. 
 In Count VI, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
violated Pennsylvania antitrust law by engaging in the activity 
alleged as the basis of Counts I through IV.  This allegation 
rises or falls with plaintiffs' federal antitrust claims.  See 
Collins v. Main Line Board of Realtors, 304 A.2d 493 (Pa. 1973); 
Schwartz v. Laundry and Linen Supply Drivers' Union, 14 A.2d 438 
(Pa. Super. 1940); plaintiffs' brief at 45; FSC's brief at 47-48.  
Therefore, our decision with respect to Counts I through IV 
disposes of Count VI as well.  Count VI survives to the extent 
that it is directed toward the theories of liability upon which 
Counts I and II are based; to the extent it is a counterpart of 
Counts III and IV, however, we will affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment. 
 B. 
 In Count VII, plaintiffs alleged that FSC and NDPA 
tortiously interfered with their existing and prospective 
contracts.  We have previously noted that the "factual 
underpinnings" of such intentional interference claims generally 
"are intertwined with" the antitrust claims they accompany, see 
Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1381-82, but that statement does not 
imply that claims of intentional interference with contractual 
relations must always survive summary judgment if a plaintiff's 
antitrust claims survive.  It merely implies what to some might 
 
 
be obvious -- that antitrust violations or other actions in 
restraint of trade are examples of improper conduct.  We are not 
bound, therefore, to reversing on the tortious interference 
claims merely because we are reversing on two of plaintiffs' 
antitrust claims.  Instead, we will affirm the grant of summary 
judgment to defendants on Count VII because plaintiffs have 
failed to demonstrate that they would be able to present evidence 
tending to prove each element of their tortious interference 
claims at trial. 
 To establish a claim of tortious interference with 
existing contracts, plaintiffs must prove that the defendants 
intentionally and improperly interfered with their performance of 
contracts with third persons.  Nathanson v. Medical College of 
Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1388 (3d Cir. 1991); Adler, Barish, 
Daniels, Levin and Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa. 
1978).  To prove their claims of tortious interference with 
prospective contractual relations, plaintiffs likewise must 
prove, inter alia, the existence of prospective contracts.  
Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. 1979).  
A prospective contract "is something less than a contractual 
right, something more than a mere hope[ ]" id.; it exists if 
there is a reasonable probability that a contract will arise from 
the parties' current dealings.  Glenn v. Point Park College, 272 
A.2d 895, 898-99 (Pa. 1971). 
 Plaintiffs have failed to identify with sufficient 
precision contracts and prospective contracts which were 
interfered with by the defendants.  They have likewise failed to 
 
 
identify an existing contract which was terminated because of the 
defendants' actions.  Nor have they demonstrated a reasonable 
probability that they would have entered into prospective 
contracts with third parties but for defendants' alleged 
interference.  See General Sound Telephone Co., Inc. v. AT&T 
Communications, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1562, 1565-66 (E.D. Pa. 1987).  
This case differs in this respect from Big Apple BMW, in which we 
reversed a grant of summary judgment on claims of intentional 
interference with contractual relations solely because their 
"factual underpinnings" were "intertwined with the antitrust 
claims" as to which we were reversing a grant of summary 
judgment.  In Big Apple BMW, the plaintiffs had specified 
transactions in which they claimed defendants' actions had 
deprived them of specific automobile dealership franchises.  In  
contrast, in this case, plaintiffs have failed to advance more 
than speculation to support their claim of tortious interference; 
therefore, we will affirm the district court as to this count. 
 C. 
 Finally, in Count X, plaintiffs alleged that the NDPA 
defamed them by publishing articles and editorials referring to 
800-number dealers as "pirates."  Under Pennsylvania law, a 
statement is defamatory if it "`tends to so harm the reputation 
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or 
to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.'"  
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 
F.2d 914, 923 (3d Cir. 1990), quoting Birl v. Philadelphia 
Electric Co., 167 A.2d 472, 475 (Pa. 1960).  To prove their 
 
 
claim, plaintiffs must show:  (1) the defamatory character of the 
statements; (2) publication by NDPA; (3) the statements' 
application to the plaintiffs; (4) an understanding by readers of 
the statements' defamatory meaning; and (5) an understanding by 
readers of an intent on the part of NDPA to refer to the 
plaintiffs.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8343(a) (1982); U.S. 
Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 923.  The law does not require that a 
plaintiff be specifically named in an allegedly defamatory 
statement, for a statement might be defamatory if, by description 
or circumstances, it tends to identify the plaintiff as its 
object.  Redco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 758 F.2d 970, 972 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
 Plaintiffs base their defamation claim upon statements 
referring to 800-number dealers in general as "pirates."  
Individual group members may sue based upon statements about a 
group when the statements were directed toward a "comparatively 
small class or group all of whose constituent members may be 
readily identified and the recipients of the [statements] are 
likely to identify some, if not all, of them as intended objects 
of the defamation."  Farrell v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 159 
A.2d 734, 736-37 (Pa. 1960).  But no claim arises from a 
defamatory remark directed toward a group whose membership is so 
numerous that no individual member can reasonably be deemed its 
intended object.  Id. at 736.  Similarly, no claim exists if, for 
any other reason, a reader could not reasonably conclude that the 
statements at issue referred to the particular person or persons 
alleging defamation.  Id. at 737. 
 
 
 Relying upon record evidence indicating that in 1990 
there were only 20 to 25 800-number dealers in the industry (app. 
at 1123-24), plaintiffs argue that they may base their claim on 
statements directed at 800-number dealers in general.  Cf. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A, comment c.  As noted above, 
however, a group's size is not the sole consideration in 
determining whether individual members may assert defamation 
claims based upon statements about the group.  A group may be 
relatively small, but statements which disparage it may not serve 
as a basis for an individual defamation claim unless a reader 
could reasonably connect them to the complaining individual. 
 In Farrell, for example, one of 13 township 
commissioners asserted a defamation claim against a newspaper 
which had published a story implicating "a number of township 
commissioners and others" in corrupt activity.  Farrell, 159 A.2d 
at 736.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the plaintiff 
had stated a claim for defamation.  In so holding, however, the 
court concentrated not on the size of the group discussed but on 
whether readers "knew that the plaintiff was one of the thirteen 
commissioners."  Id. at 738.  We similarly do not end our inquiry 
upon being apprised that there were between 20 and 25 800-number 
dealers in 1990; we examine whether the plaintiffs were 
"sufficiently identified as [objects of NDPA's statements] to 
justifiably warrant a conclusion that [their] individual 
reputation[s have] been substantially injured."  Id. at 736. 
 Here, there is nothing in the record other than the 
number of 800-dealers which could support a conclusion that any 
 
 
of the plaintiffs' individual reputations were injured by NDPA's 
statements about 800-number dealers in general.  Indeed, the 
individual identities of this group's members are, by the very 
nature of their business, less meaningful than the telephone 
numbers they promote to facilitate discount purchases.  This 
group appears amorphous and ill-defined when compared to the 
well-defined group of township commissioners at issue in Farrell.  
Plaintiffs have not produced evidence tending to prove that they 
belong to such an easily identifiable, cohesive group that a 
reader would ascribe statements referring to 800-number dealers 
in general as "pirates" to any of them individually.  Thus, we 
will affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on 
Count X. 
 VIII. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's grant of summary judgment as to Counts I and II, as well 
as the corresponding portion of Count VI, but will affirm its 





ALVORD-POLK, INC., ET AL., v. F. SCHUMACHER & CO., ET AL. 




STAPLETON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
    
 I would affirm the district court's summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants on the vertical conspiracy count and, 
accordingly, dissent from Section V of the court's opinion.  I am 
also unable to join all of Sections IV-A, VII-A, and VII-B.  I do 
join the remainder of the court's opinion.  I comment only on the 
trade association aspect of the horizontal conspiracy charge and 
on the vertical conspiracy charge. 
 
 I. 
 Trade associations have been held liable for 
unreasonably restraining trade in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, even when they have not been accused of contracting, 
combining, or conspiring with other unrelated actors.  See, e.g., 
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679 (1978).  Courts, however, have not articulated how a trade 
association, by itself, can violate a statute which "does not 
prohibit unreasonable restraints on trade as such -- but only 
restraints effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy."  
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 
(1984).   
 A sound theory of trade association liability under 
section 1 will recognize the anticompetitive potential inherent 
 
 
in an agglomeration of competitors.  Indeed, trade associations 
have fixed prices, see, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U.S. 773 (1975), organized group boycotts, see, e.g., Fashion 
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), 
allocated customers and territories, see, e.g., United States v. 
Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), and suppressed potential 
competitors, see, e.g., United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfr. 
Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).  A sound theory of trade association 
liability, however, also will recognize that some trade 
association activities are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
preservation of competition.  These activities include 
cooperative research, market surveys, development of new uses for 
products, mutual insurance, publication of trade journals, 
advertising, and joint representation before legislative and 
administrative agencies.  See Julian O. van Kalinowski, Antitrust 
Laws and Trade Regulation § 6I.01.  Most trade associations are 
organized for the purpose of pursuing these kinds of activities 
and most members initially join because of the benefit to be 
derived therefrom.  If such an association thereafter engages in 
anticompetitive activity, only a limited number of its members 
may be involved in, or even aware of, the change of course.  
Finally, a sound theory of trade association liability will 
conform with the "well-established" rule that "[a] single person 
or entity acting alone is not subject to the strictures of 
Section 1."  Earl W. Kintner, Federal Antitrust Law § 9.7. 
 The plaintiffs insist that trade association activity 
is concerted activity for purposes of section 1.  Since any 
 
 
activity of an officer of an association engaged in with apparent 
authority is activity of the association under conventional rules 
of agency, any such activity, in plaintiffs' view, is thus 
concerted activity for purposes of section 1.  This logic 
eviscerates the concerted action requirement of section 1.14   
 In my view, the agreement element of a section 1 claim 
is satisfied if, but only if, it is shown that two or more of the 
association's members have committed themselves to the anti-
competitive activity of the trade association and to the 
accomplishment of its objectives.  Thus, in the absence of a 
conspiracy between the trade association and a third party, the 
association can be liable only if some of its members are using 
it to unreasonably restrain trade.   
 Since a trade association is normally controlled by its 
members, where an association has engaged in anticompetitive 
activity, it normally will not be difficult to show the necessary 
agreement among a group of its members.  The focus of the theory 
on the commitment of its members to anticompetitive activity, 
however, has important corollary consequences.  One is that 
members of the trade association who neither participate nor 
knowingly acquiesce in the association's anticompetitive 
activity, unlike those who do, will not be held liable along with 
the association.  See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 
                     
14.  For the reasons explained in the court's opinion, the agency 
principles discussed in American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. 
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982), and the Supreme Court's 
application of those principles in that case are not pertinent 
until a violation of section 1 has been established.  
 
 
F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); 
Phelps Dodge Refining Corp. v. FTC, 139 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1943); 
see generally,  Earl W. Kinter, Federal Antitrust Law § 9.16.  
 Another collateral consequence of this theory of 
concerted activity is that, in the absence of membership 
commitment to an activity engaged in by an association officer or 
a conspiracy between the officer and some other entity, the 
activity of the officer is not concerted activity.  It seems to 
me that this must be true without regard to whether the officer 
had apparent authority to act as he did, although evidence 
supporting the existence of apparent authority may also 
constitute circumstantial evidence tending to show concerted 
activity on the part of the members of the association. 
 As the district court recognized, if NDPA's directors, 
acting on behalf of the retailers they represent, had passed a 
resolution instructing its officers to recruit retailers for a 
boycott of any manufacturer who dealt with 800-number dealers and 
to threaten manufacturers with such a boycott, and an officer of 
the association had carried out this directive, the association 
clearly would have engaged in concerted activity for purposes of 
section 1.  As the district court emphasized, there is no 
evidence of such formal corporate action in this record. 
 The district court erred, however, by not continuing 
its inquiry beyond this level.  If NDPA's directors did not pass 
such a resolution but, acting on behalf of the retailers they 
represented, tacitly agreed among themselves to so instruct 
NDPA's officers, the association would just as surely be engaged 
 
 
in concerted activity when an officer carried out this agreement.  
In this situation, as in the first, NDPA would have been used by 
its members, through their representatives on the board, to 
engage in concerted activity.  The same would be true if an 
officer of the NDPA had initiated this kind of anti-competitive 
activity without the knowledge or approval of the board and the 
board, after learning of it, had approved or acquiesced in it.  
As a matter of antitrust theory, however, I do not think that an 
activity of an NDPA officer, even if engaged in with apparent 
authority, can constitute concerted activity in the absence of 
some basis for inferring member commitment to that activity. 
 With this theoretical background, I turn to the summary 
judgment record in this case.  Plaintiffs urge that a trier of 
fact could infer from the present record that officers of NDPA, 
with the approval of NDPA's board and the retailers they 
represent, threatened FSC and other manufacturers with a dealer 
boycott if they did not take measures against the 800-number 
dealers.  I do not understand the defendants to urge at this 
stage that such an inference would not provide a satisfactory 
basis for imposing section 1 liability.15  They do insist, 
however, that such an inference cannot reasonably be drawn from 
the current record.  While the issue is a close one, I think 
there is enough evidence to make the plaintiffs' inference a 
permissible one.   
                     
15.  I express no opinion on whether the activities the 
defendants are accused of engaging in constitute an unreasonable 




 Mr. Petit, the CEO of NDPA, candidly acknowledged 
speaking directly to numerous manufacturers after the consent 
decree about the concerns of conventional retailers regarding 
800-number dealers.  Given the past history of the matter and Mr. 
Petit's view that the scope of FTC's consent decree was of very 
limited effect, a rational trier of fact could infer that Mr. 
Petit continued, after the decree, not only to express to 
manufacturers the concerns of the conventional dealers, but also 
to call upon them to take specific steps to thwart the 800-number 
dealers.  When he spoke to manufacturers about this matter, he 
spoke on behalf of the NDPA.  As he testified, he spoke about 
"the concerns of the NDPA."  App. 191.  Clearly, he viewed 
himself as authorized by the NDPA to say what he did.  As he put 
it, "That's my job," referring to his campaign among the 
manufacturers.  App. 192. 
 As the defendants stress, there is no direct evidence 
of a threat of a boycott by Mr. Petit or anyone else on NDPA's 
behalf.  There is, however, evidence that Mr. Petit emphasized to 
the manufacturers "the anger felt by the retailers in [the] lack 
of support from the wallcovering industry,"  App. 185, and that  
his demands for action by the manufacturers came against a 
background of public, oral and written advice from NDPA officers 
that conventional retailers should deal only with those 
manufacturers who supported them.  When one adds to this evidence 
the fact that some manufacturers did respond with measures 
against the 800-number dealers, I believe a trier of fact could 
 
 
conclude that a boycott threat was intended by the NDPA officers 
and understood by the manufacturers.   
 Finally, if a trier of fact inferred that NDPA officers 
implicitly threatened a boycott, it would be permissible for the 
trier of fact to further infer that the NDPA board members knew 
of the boycott threat and at least tacitly approved it.  Mr. 
Petit's triumphant memorandum of January 29, 1990, to the board 
members is strong circumstantial evidence supporting this view.  
That memorandum, it will be recalled, declared that FSC's 
decision not to sell to the "sales pirates" was "a major step 
forward in our battle against the 800-number operators."  App. 
693 (emphasis added).  There is, in addition, evidence that the 
board regularly discussed this matter and it was receiving 
intense pressure from NDPA membership to do something about the 
problem. Thus, like my colleagues, I would reverse the district 
court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the 
horizontal conspiracy charge. 
 
 II. 
 Turning to the charged vertical conspiracy, I start 
with the undisputed propositions that (1) potential purchasers of 
wallcovering normally desire to view samples of the merchandise 
before making a purchase, (2) as a result, FSC has for years sold 
sample books and promotional materials and has for years 
encouraged other investment from its retailers to facilitate 
customer selection and satisfaction, and (3) the 800-number 
retailers are free riders as far as that investment is concerned.  
 
 
Since FSC cannot long remain successfully in business if its 
retailers are unwilling to make the investment necessary to 
facilitate customer selection and satisfaction, FSC has a 
legitimate and compelling interest in making sure free riders do 
not maintain a competitive advantage over retailers who are 
willing to make that investment.  Nothing in this record tends to 
show that FSC took any action with respect to the plaintiffs 
other than to serve this interest.  In particular, there is no 
evidence from which a finder of fact could infer a retail price 
maintenance conspiracy involving FSC.  Under the now-familiar 
teachings of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 
752 (1984), the mere fact that FSC's conventional retailers 
complained and FSC acted in response to those complaints does not 
preclude summary judgment for the defendants. 
 In Monsanto, a manufacturer and some of its 
distributors allegedly conspired to sanction a discount 
distributor.  The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that 
section 1 outlaws only some sanctions against a discount 
distributor:  unilateral conduct is not forbidden and concerted 
action is per se illegal only when it fixes prices.  Id. at 760-
61.  The Supreme Court then observed that these distinctions are 
often difficult to apply in practice because the economic effect 
of legal and illegal conduct can be similar -- indeed, "judged 
from a distance, the conduct of the parties in the various 
situations can be indistinguishable."  Id. at 762.  Care, the 
Supreme Court directed, should be taken in inferring a conspiracy 
from highly ambiguous evidence, lest perfectly legitimate conduct 
 
 
is deterred or penalized.  Id. at 763.  The Supreme Court went on 
to hold that a vertical conspiracy cannot be inferred solely from 
evidence of complaints from distributors to a manufacturer about 
a discount distributor and a resulting termination of the 
discount distributor: 
 Permitting an agreement to be inferred merely 
from the existence of complaints, or even 
from the fact that termination came about "in 
response to" complaints, could deter or 
penalize perfectly legitimate conduct. . . . 
Moreover, distributors are an important 
source of information for manufacturers.  In 
order to assure an efficient distribution 
system, manufacturers and distributors 
constantly must coordinate their activities 
to assure that their product will reach the 
consumer persuasively and efficiently.  To 
bar a manufacturer from acting solely because 
the information upon which it acts originated 
as a price complaint would create an 
irrational dislocation in the market. . . . 
 
  Thus, something more than evidence of 
complaints is needed.  There must be evidence 
that tends to exclude the possibility that 
the manufacturer and nonterminated 
distributors were acting independently.  As 
Judge Aldisert has written, the antitrust 
plaintiff should present direct or 
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends 
to prove that the manufacturer and others 
"had a conscious commitment to a common 
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful 
objective." 
 
Id. at 764.   
 The three pieces of evidence that the plaintiffs in 
this case have offered to prove a vertical conspiracy fail to 
meet the standard that the Supreme Court set forth in Monsanto.  
First, the plaintiffs note that the conventional retailers 
 
 
complained to FSC about the 800-number dealers.  Complaints like 
these are precisely what the Supreme Court considered in Monsanto 
and found to be insufficient to prove a vertical conspiracy: 
 [C]omplaints about price cutters "are natural 
-- and from the manufacturer's perspective, 
unavoidable -- reactions by distributors to 
their rivals."  Such complaints, particularly 
where the manufacturer has imposed a costly 
set of nonprice restrictions, "arise in the 
normal course of business and do not indicate 
illegal concerted action." 
 
Id. at 763 (citations omitted).  
 Second, plaintiffs offer evidence that FSC did not use 
mathematical calculations from its own cost data to set the drop-
shipment surcharge, even though the surcharge was purportedly 
instituted to equalize the costs of deliveries to the 
conventional and 800-number retailers.  The absence of 
mathematical calculation supposedly suggests a vertical 
conspiracy:  in the words of this court, "FSC may have imposed 
the surcharge without first undertaking mathematical calculations 
because it had agreed with others to impose the surcharge whether 
it made economic sense or not." 
 FSC's determination of the drop-shipment surcharge is 
not probative of whether FSC acted alone or in conspiracy with 
the conventional retailers.  An arbitrarily chosen surcharge is 
equally compatible with both unilateral and concerted conduct.  
Seeking to end destructive free-riding, FSC might have exercised 
its right under United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919), to 
unilaterally limit its dealings with 800-number retailers and, 
toward that end, imposed a substantial surcharge to level the 
 
 
playing field for conventional retailers, or even to cripple the 
800-number retailers.  While I acknowledge that FSC and the 
conventional retailers conceivably could have conspired to 
cripple the 800-number retailers through a substantial surcharge, 
that concession does not preclude summary judgment for the 
defendants.  Because a surcharge fixed by FSC is equally 
compatible with both hypotheses, no inference of conspiracy can 
be drawn:  "Monsanto . . . establishes that conduct that is as 
consistent with permissible competition as with illegal 
conspiracy does not, without more, support even an inference of 
conspiracy."  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 n.21 (1986).         
 Plaintiffs' third piece of evidence of a vertical 
conspiracy is the differently-phrased explanations FSC offered in 
internal and external communications for the drop-shipment 
surcharge.  This court observes that "a jury might view FSC's 
apparent desire to use more genteel language when explaining its 
actions to the public as implying a sinister motive." 
 FSC's liability under section 1, however, does not turn 
on whether FSC had "a sinister motive," but whether it acted 
alone or in combination with the conventional retailers.  The 
varying tones in internal and external communications are 
consistent with both hypotheses -- the sanitized language that 
FSC used to avoid drawing attention to its moves against the 800-
number dealers could have been the result of either a unilateral 
decision to eliminate free-riding or a conspiracy with the 
conventional dealers against the 800-number retailers.  Once more 
 
 
plaintiffs have presented "highly ambiguous evidence," Monsanto, 
465 U.S. at 763, that does not tend "to exclude the possibility 
that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting 
independently," id. at 764.      
 A misreading of Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North 
America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 1262 (1993), may well be responsible for the court's decision 
on the vertical conspiracy count.  In Big Apple BMW, we noted 
that a manufacturer's "inconsistent reasons" for denying a 
franchise support an inference of conspiracy with existing 
franchisees.  Id. at 1374.  The court seizes on this language 
from Big Apple BMW to argue that FSC's drop-shipment surcharge 
and the varying tones of internal and external communication 
about the surcharge are inconsistencies which permit an inference 
of conspiracy.  This analogy is flawed.   
  In Big Apple BMW, unsuccessful applicants for an 
automobile dealership brought a claim under section 1, charging 
that the manufacturer and existing dealers conspired to deny them 
the dealership because they would have been price cutters.  The 
plaintiffs identified actions of the defendants which suggested a 
conspiracy, but the defendants tendered business reasons for each 
of their actions.  We found that summary judgment was 
inappropriate:  even though the defendants had offered 
justifications for their actions, these justifications were 
"internally inconsistent and inconsistent with [the 
manufacturer's] concomitant treatment of [other] dealers."  Id. 
at 1374.  For example, the manufacturer claimed that it refused 
 
 
to award a franchise to the applicants because they attempted to 
bribe one of its employees; evidence showed that the same 
employee solicited the applicants to buy a franchise only a year 
after the attempted bribe.  Id. at 1368.  The manufacturer 
claimed that it refused to award a franchise to the applicants 
because they would have engaged in price advertising; evidence 
showed that other dealers engaged in price advertising.  Id. at 
1378.  The manufacturer claimed that it refused to award a 
franchise to the applicants because they would have located their 
dealership in an "automall" adjacent to other manufacturers' 
dealerships; evidence showed that the manufacturer tolerated 
other multi-franchise dealerships.  Id. at 1380.   
 In Big Apple BMW, if the trier of fact believed the 
plaintiffs' evidence that tended to show pretext, it would be 
left with no reason to believe that the manufacturer acted 
unilaterally to advance its own self interest.  This case is 
fundamentally different.  A trier of fact in this case could 
believe that FSC did not calculate the drop charge from its cost 
data and could agree with every inference plaintiffs seek to draw 
from the draft press release and this would still not alter the 
indisputable fact that FSC had a legitimate and compelling self 
interest in solving the free rider problem and preserving an 
effective distribution system. 
 Finding no evidence in the record that tends to exclude 
the possibility that FSC acted unilaterally against the 800-
number dealers, I would affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on the vertical conspiracy count.   
